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Faculty and Deans

HALPIN ON DWORKIN'S FALLACY: A SURREPLY
Michael Steven Green*

P

ROFESSOR Halpin claims to read my 2003 Essay Dworkin's
Fallacy generously, by "accept[ing] that Green is correct in rejecting the assumed connection between the philosophy of language and the philosophy of law."' We later discover, however,
that he believes it is possible to "refute Green's arguments that
there is no necessary connection between [the philosophy of law] and
the philosophy of language. " 2
Is the generosity feigned? Perhaps not, for there are really two
arguments in my Essay and Halpin might be understood as accepting the first and rejecting the second. The first argument is that a
particular confusion of linguistic and legal practices-which I call
Dworkin's fallacy-can motivate the philosopher of law to misderive jurisprudential conclusions from semantic premises. Halpin
might be generous in accepting that Dworkin's fallacy is indeed a
fallacy. But I also claim that this fallacy is the cause of much, if not
most, jurisprudential interest in the philosophy of language. For
this reason, I argue that "[t]he philosophy of language generally
has no jurisprudential consequences" 3 and that "philosophers of
law would have been better off if the philosophy of language had
been set aside entirely."4
Halpin is wrong to attribute to me the view that there is no necessary connection between the two fields. 5 I devoted the conclusion
of my previous Essay to describing three cases where Dworkin's
fallacy does not apply, and the philosophy of language is relevant

• Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law. Ph.D. (Philosophy), Yale University, 1990; J.D., Yale Law School, 1996.
'Andrew Halpin, Or, Even, What the Law Can Teach the Philosophy of Language:
A Response to Green's Dworkin's Fallacy, 91 Va. L. Rev. 175, 175 (2005).
2
ld. at 180.
3
Michael Steven Green, Dworkin's Fallacy, Or What the Philosophy of Language
Can't Teach Us About the Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1897, 1898 (2003).
4
Id. at 1946.
'Id. at 1947 ("I cannot ... make a categorical claim about the irrelevance [of the
philosophy of language for the philosophy of law]." (emphasis added)).
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to jurisprudential concerns. 6 But even in these three cases I am
skeptical that the philosophy of language will provide us with much
of jurisprudential interest. Halpin, it seems, disagrees.
I'll begin by identifying Dworkin's fallacy and distinguishing it
from the legitimate connections between the philosophies of language and law that are Halpin's area of interest. This will be followed by a discussion of whether these connections, although legitimate, are significant. Finally I will discuss another substantive
disagreement between the two of us-whether Dennis Patterson's
legal theory suffers from Dworkin's fallacy.
I. DWORKIN'S FALLACY
Dworkin's fallacy is the belief that a jurisprudential theory-a
theory of the nature of the law-can be arrived at by applying a
semantic theory to the word "law." To get a feel for the fallacy, it is
important to understand some of the jurisprudential and semantic
theories at issue.
There is a long-standing jurisprudential tradition according to
which the existence of law is ultimately a question of convention.
For example, according to this approach, the Constitution is valid
American law because it has been accepted as law by American officials or the American people as a whole. H .L.A. Hart is a member of this tradition, for he explains the ultimate source of law in a
rule of recognition-.that is, a practice among officials of enforcing
certain norms (such as the Constitution) and not others (such as
the Articles of Confederation) according to whether they satisfy
accepted criteria for legality. Ronald Dworkin, in contrast, is anticonventionalist. A norm can be law, he argues, even if it is not accepted by officials in a jurisdiction as law, provided it is revealed as
law through a process of interpretive reflection on the underlying
moral purposes of legal practices.
There is a seemingly parallel debate concerning conventionalism
in semantics. According to the semantic conventionalist, a term's
reference (that is, the set of things that fall under the term) is determined by the accepted criteria for employing the term. In the
sixteenth century the term "gold" referred to everything that was a
heavy, yellow, ductile metal, because those were the criteria asso• Id . at 1946--52; see also id. at 1927 n.76.
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ciated with the use of the term. In the twenty-first century, however, "gold" refers to everything that has the atomic number 79,
because that is now the accepted criterion (at least among scientists).
Some philosophers of language-call them "realists"-disagree.
Although people in the sixteenth century would have applied the
word "gold" to a heavy, yellow, ductile metal that did not have the
atomic number 79, even in the sixteenth century the term actually
referred only to stuff with that atomic number. The underlying
structure of gold, not accepted use, determines the reference of the
word.
Underlying structures seem unavailable, however, to explain
the reference of terms like "justice" or "law." Nevertheless,
some philosophers-call them "interpretivists"-argue that semantic anti-conventionalism is possible here as well. The reference of
these words can still outstrip accepted use, because the practice of
using the words can reform itself through a process of reflective
equilibrium, revealing criteria for use of which participants were
previously unaware. Although most Americans in the early nineteenth century would have called slavery "just," slavery did not in
fact fall under the term (even for them), because the practice of using the term has reformed itself over time.
Dworkin argues that Hart's conventionalist semantics is responsible for his conventionalist jurisprudence. Because Hart takes the
reference of the term "law" to be determined by accepted use, he
concludes that a norm is law only if officials within a jurisdiction
agree that it is law. Furthermore, in his famous "semantic sting"
argument, Dworkin uses the failure of conventionalist semantics to
argue that Hart's conventionalist jurisprudence likewise fails.
This is Dworkin's fallacy. To see why it is a fallacy, consider the
simpler example of the word "convention."7 If interpretive semantics applied to this word, its reference would be determined, not by
accepted use, but by whatever criteria eventually resulted from reflective equilibrium. But even though the practice of using the
word "convention" is not determined by agreement, it does not fol-

7

As I noted in my prior Essay, I borrowed this example from Michael Moore, Law
as a Functional Kind, in Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays 188, 205 (Robert
P. George ed., 1992). See Green, supra note 3, at 1931 n.89.
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low that conventions are not determined by agreement. It is entirely possible-indeed overwhelmingly likely-that, after reflective equilibrium is over, we will have arrived at the conclusion that
a practice is a convention only to the extent that there is agreement
among its participants.
Conventions can be conventional even when the practice of talking about them is not for the simple reason that the practice of
talking about practices is different from the practices talked about.
Analogously, Dworkin confuses legal practices-in particular, rules
of recognition-with the linguistic practice of talking about these
legal practices. Even if one assumes that interpretive semantics applies to the word "law," the fact remains that, at the end of reflective equilibrium, we could still conclude that a norm deserves to be
called the "law" of a jurisdiction only if officials in that jurisdiction
agree that it should be enforced.
Dworkin does not merely conflate semantic and jurisprudential
conventionalism-he also conflates semantic and jurisprudential
interpretivism. In Law's Empire, he treats the semantic sting argument as a sufficient reason to adopt his interpretive jurisprudence.
But simply because the proper criteria for using the word "law" are
whatever will result from reflective equilibrium among the participants in the linguistic practice of using the word is not a reason to
conclude that the law of a jurisdiction is whatever will result from
critical reflection by the participants in its rule of recognition, much
less critical reflection on the moral purposes of that legal practice,
as is the case in Dworkin's interpretive jurisprudence.8
Of course, Dworkin's interpretive jurisprudence or any number
of other nonconventionalist theories of law could result from reflective equilibrium on the linguistic practice of using the word
"law." (Another nonconventionalist jurisprudence is classical natu• We should not be distracted by the fact that Dworkin provides a further argument
against conventionalism from within the framework of interpretive jurisprudence.
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 114-50 (1986). Dworkin considers whether reflection
upon the moral purposes of our legal practices should not lead us to conclude that the
law is best limited to norms concerning which there is official agreement, in order to
respect citizens' settled expectations. (He ultimately rejects this argument in favor of
his theory of law as integrity.) But the question remains why Dworkin's methodology
of interpretive jurisprudence is justified in the first place. And he arrives at this methodology, via Dworkin's fallacy, through his semantic sting argument. Green, supra
note 3, at 1920 n.63.
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rallaw theory, in which a norm must satisfy independent moral criteria to qualify as law.) But that simply shows that there is no essential connection between semantics and jurisprudence of the sort
that Dworkin assumes.

II. BEYOND DWORKIN'S FALLACY: OTHER CONNECfiONS
BETWEEN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF LANGUAGE AND LAW

Dworkin's fallacy rests upon the conflation of the linguistic practice of using the word "law" with rules of recognition. But as Halpin rightly notes, it is not a fallacy to assume that there are other
connections between linguistic and legal practices that could make
the philosophy of language relevant to the philosophy of law:
"[L]aw is, among other things, a practice of using words. It is possible then that the position we take on the practice of using words
within our philosophy of language is the same position we adopt on
the practice of using words in our philosophy of law. " 9
Halpin is correct that lawyers and judges talk (a lot) and so legal
practices cannot help but incorporate linguistic practices. Furthermore there is no reason to believe that the semantics that applies
to words outside the law would not also apply to them when they
are used within the law.
I provide an example illustrating just this point in the conclusion
to Dworkin's Fallacy. If a constitutional amendment establishes the
gold standard, the semantics of the word "gold" should be relevant
to a judge interpreting the scope of the amendment. This could
have an important impact on our understanding of the legal practice of adjudication. Under realist or interpretive semantics, the
judge could show fidelity to the meaning of the amendment even if
she took it to apply to stuff that its drafters would not have called
"gold."
I make the same point earlier in the Essay as well. 10 If interpretive semantics is right, jurisprudential conventionalists like Hart
must admit that this semantics applies to the words used to articulate the criteria in the rule of recognition. 11 For example, assume
there is a crude rule of recognition under which officials enforce
9

Halpin, supra note 1, at 177.
Green, supra note 3, at 1927 n.76.
11
Id. at 1927 n.76.

10
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only norms that are on a tablet. According to interpretive semantics, a norm might properly be described as "on the tablet"-and so
be law according to the rule of recognition-even though the participants in the rule of recognition don't think it is. 12
This connection between linguistic and legal practices might be a
reason to think that my second argument is wrong, but not my first.
Dworkin's fallacy depends upon the belief that rules of recognition
are the same thing as the linguistic practice of using the word "law,"
not the belief that legal practices cannot incorporate linguistic
practices. Dworkin's fallacy is tempting because anyone participating in a rule of recognition-for example, a judge adjudicating a
case-will call the norms that she enforces "law," which makes the
rule of recognition look like the practice of using the word "law."
And if they were the same practice, then Dworkin's fallacy would
not be a fallacy. The norms governing our employment of the word
"law" would be legal norms, and linguistic and legal anticonventionalism would amount to the same thing.
But the two practices are not the same. Although Halpin finds
the distinctions I draw between the two practices unconvincing, he
does not address the fundamental difference that I pointed out in
my previous Essay. Dworkin's fallacy, I argued, "depends upon
confusin~ the practice of describing a practice with the practice described." 3 Participating in a practice of talking about legal practices
is clearly not the same thing as participating in the practices described. It is possible to speak of American, French, and German
law in the same breath. It is not possible to sit simultaneously on
the Supreme Court, the Conseil Constitutionnel, and the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
It is the linguistic practice of talking about legal practices that establishes the meaning and reference of the word "law" and thus the
conditions for the existence of law in various jurisdictions. If the
participants in the linguistic practice determine that a norm should
be called the "law" of a jurisdiction only if it meets independent
moral requirements, then even if all the judges in the jurisdiction
enforce norms that violate these moral requirements, such norms
are not the law of that jurisdiction. To be sure, most people con12

13

Id.
Id. at 1919.
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sider the fact that judges enforce a norm to be a reason to conclude
that the norm is the law of that jurisdiction. But that is simply a reflection of the fact that we, as participants in the linguistic practice,
are inclined toward conventionalist jurisprudence.
Halpin may not be arguing that the two practices are the same
however. His point may be only that the philosophy of language
that applies to the practice of using the word "law" will also apply
to legal practices, insofar as words are used in those practices. Of
course, as my gold standard and tablet examples show, I do not
deny this. But Halpin's target may be my second argument-that the
connections between the philosophies of language and law (those
that do not suffer from Dworkin's fallacy, that is) are insignificant.
Because legal practices incorporate linguistic practices, he may bearguing, we have reason to believe that the effect of the philosophy of
language on the philosophy of law will be significant.
Halpin sees another very different connection between linguistic
and legal practices that may threaten my second argument as well.
This is his idea that "both the law and the language of the law are
developed together at the point of determining what the law requires."14 Halpin's is a general methodological point that is not tied
to particular theories of the law. To show this, he assumes that we
accept natural law theory:
[I]f ... we reject the court's judgment that a contract is valid because it fails to satisfy an independent moral requirement, we
still need a judgment as to how that independent moral requirement . . . applies to this particular agreement. At that point of
judgment both the law and the word "contract" are clarified. 15
Because "both the law and the language of the law are simultaneously and inextricably together clarified," 16 the law cannot be divorced from our practices of talking about the law.
I discuss what I believe is a similar idea when outlining the conventionalist theory of meaning. This theory, I argue, "is tied to essential issues of philosophical method" 17 in the following sense: For
the conventionalist, an account of the meaning of a word will also
14

Halpin, supra note 1, at 180.

15

ld.
ld.

16

17

Green, supra note 3, at 1900.
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be an account of the existence conditions for the thing to which the
word refers. This connection between linguistic practices and the
things to which these practices refer is what grounds the traditional
philosopher's method. Traditional philosophers analyze the meanings of words like "freedom," "knowledge," or "law" to find out
"what must be the case for freedom, knowledge or law to exist in
the world." 18 This means that, for the traditionalist, Halpin is
right-"both the law and the language of the law are simultaneously and inextricably together clarified. " 19
Of course, the traditional philosopher of law does not believe
that every truth about the law can be revealed simply by reflecting
on our practice of talking about the law. Only analytic truths about
the law can be arrived at in this fashion. Jurisprudential theories
(such as conventionalism or natural law theory) might be examples
of such analytic truths, but not particular judgments about whether
something is the law of a jurisdiction. And Halpin's contract example suggests that he is arguing that the practice of talking about the
law is clarified whenever the law is. After all, that a particular
agreement is a valid contract is not an analytic truth about the
law-it is synthetic, in the sense that it requires information over
and above knowledge of the meaning of the word "law" or "contract."
But there is a possibility of making sense of Halpin's more comprehensive claim if we turn to interpretive semantics. 20 If this semantics is correct, there is no distinction between empirical inquiry
into the thing to which a word refers and the transformation,
through reflective equilibrium, of the practice of talking about that
thing. 21 It is not as if we have a definition of "law" and then consider the evidence to see what does and does not fit this definition.
The definition is always vulnerable to reform in the process of
making particular judgments. In this sense, it is true as a compreId.
Halpin, supra note 1, at 180.
20
That the same point applies if one adopts realist semantics is more doubtful. The
realist understands the meaning of a term as fixed by the underlying structure of the
stuff first pointed to in connection with the word, to which linguistic practices may
forever fail to correspond. This suggests that reality reveals itself in a way that is divorced from the development of our linguistic practices. I cannot, however, pursue
this issue here.
21
Green, supra note 3, at 1913.
Is

19
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hensive matter that "the law and the language of the law are simultaneously and inextricably together clarified." 22
Once again, I agree with Halpin's methodological point. As I argued in my previous Essay, if the interpretive theory of meaning is
true of the word "law," then "we can figure out which norms
should be called 'law' only by participating in the interpretive practice of using that word. "23 The unfolding of the law and the unfolding of the practice of talking about the law will be indistinguishable. Halpin's point will also apply if one accepts a Wittgensteinian
theory (or anti-theory) of meaning-and it is indeed Wittgenstein,
not interpretive semantics, that Halpin is primarily thinking about.
Here too, figuring out what is and is not law can be answered only
"within the framework of our practices concerning the use of the
word 'law."' 24
What all this shows is that the philosophy of language is very
relevant to the questions of jurisprudential method. How one understands linguistic practices-and so the practice of using the
word "law"-will determine what it means to inquire into the law.
The conventionalist, realist, interpretivist, and Wittgensteinian will
each have a different view of what a philosopher of law is doing
when she provides a theory of the nature of the law.
In the conclusion to Dworkin's Fallacy, I identify the philosophy
of language as relevant to questions of jurisprudential method in
just this sense. Indeed, I apparently go further than Halpin and argue that there are cases where the philosophy of language has the
potential to generate substantive jurisprudential conclusions.
Theories of the nature of the law, I argue, might be blocked by philosophies of language, because the latter might show that we could
never use the word "law" in a way that would generate the former.
For example, natural law theory would not be viable if a verificationist philosophy of language told us that we are unable to speak
about morality.
This is, once again, a reason to believe that my second argument
is mistaken. But it is not a reason to think that Dworkin's fallacy is
not a fallacy. Dworkin's fallacy arises from conflating the practice

22

Halpin, supra note 1, at 180.
Green, supra note 3, at 1919-20.
24
Id. at 1943.
23
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of talking about the law with a legal practice in a particular jurisdiction, namely, the rule of recognition. One can reject the fallacy
and still accept Halpin's idea that the law of various jurisdictions is
revealed in the context of the linguistic practice of talking about
them.
Ill. How SIGNIFICANT IS THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAw?

In short, both Halpin and I think there are legitimate areas of
connection between the philosophies of language and law. But,
unlike Halpin, I argue these connections do not make much of a
difference.
For example, even though I admit that semantic theories will
apply to words used within legal practices, I question whether these
theories will have much effect on our understanding of legal practices. Realist and interpretive semantics, although permitting reference that outstrips current agreement, do not mandate it. The
drafters of our gold standard amendment are not obligated to refer
to what is actually gold. They can make it clear that they are using
the word in a way that is intended to refer only to what is conventionally thought to be gold at the time of drafting. 25
By the same token, although interpretive semantics can have an
effect on the conventionalist's understanding of the criteria used
within a rule of recognition, it cannot show that a conventionalist
theory of law is wrong. The fact that a norm could be "on the tablet" even though the participants in the rule of recognition don't
think it is does not show that the law is nonconventional. The law
can still be conventional in the sense that being "on the tablet" is
all that matters when determining the law of that jurisdiction, because this criterion is the only one agreed upon by participants in
the rule of recognition. 26
Halpin, in contrast, thinks the connections between the philosophies of language and law are significant. Nevertheless, I doubt
25

Id. at 1950-51.
Id. at 1928 n.76. Furthermore, since reflective equilibrium is undertaken from the
perspective of the prereflective commitments of participants in the linguistic practice
reflected upon, any reform of the use of a term will not be radical. This makes it
unlikely that a norm is going to suddenly be identified as being "on the tablet" that
was not considered to be on the tablet before.
26
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that the reason is that he thinks the above arguments are mistaken,
since he never discusses them in his reply.
Halpin's real concern is the importance of the philosophy of language for questions of jurisprudential method. Here too, I was
skeptical that the philosophy of language will yield interesting
jurisprudential consequences. Even though the philosophy of language reveals what a philosopher of law is doing when she comes
up with a theory of law, it does not tell us whether this theory will
(or should) be natural law theory, Dworkinian interpretivism, Hartian conventionalism, or something else. 27 Indeed, even if certain
theories of the nature of the law can be "blocked" by a position in
the philosophy of language, I argue, there will be little in the way
of jurisprudential consequences, because plenty of non-blocked
jurisprudential positions will remain to choose from. 28
Curiously, here as well Halpin does not appear to disagree with
my argument. Indeed, he even joins me in suggesting that the
methodological insight provided by Wittgenstein "furnishes no help
in deciding between competing views of how 'law'/law should be understood. ,m
The truth is the connections between the philosophies of language and law that Halpin identifies are of a very different sort
from those I entertained in Dworkin's Fallacy. I was concerned
with whether the philosophy of language could provide substantive
results in the philosophy of law. From what I can tell, Halpin
agrees with me that it cannot. But Halpin argues that the philosophy of law has important consequences for the philosophy of language. Hence the title of his reply.
If I understand him correctly, Halpin's point is this: Jurisprudential disagreements concerning the proper theory of law are the result of the contentiousness of individual judgments about what is
law. Of course, this is not in itself surprising, since in any area of
inquiry disagreement in individual judgments about the thing investigated will tend to express itself in competing theories of that
thing. If people disagree in their judgments about what is gold, they
are likely to come up with different theories of gold. Just as reality

27

Id. at 1948.
Id. at 1950.
29
Halpin, supra note 1, at 184.
28
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anci our practice of talking about reality are revealed together, they
are obscured together.
But in the law, Halpin argues, "the very use of judgment is posited on controversy." 30 There are practical considerations impelling
us toward a judgment about what is law, considerations that do not
exist elsewhere. For this reason "the co-relationship between law and
language breaks down. " 31 Practical necessity will mean that legal
judgment will precede the evolution of our practice of talking about
the law. In this sense, "the practice of language depends on the practice of law."32 It is this important insight, Halpin claims, that "the law
can teach the philosophy of language. " 33
Unfortunately without further elaboration on these suggestive remarks, I cannot come to a conclusion about whether I agree with
him. It is fair to say that even if he is correct (and I am not saying that
he is not), we are quite far from the concerns of my previous Essay,
which had to do with whether the philosophy of language could generate substantive jurisprudential consequences.
IV. DENNIS PATIERSON AND DWORKIN'S FALLACY
One aspect of Halpin's reply for which I am particularly thankful
is his discussion of Dennis Patterson's legal theory. In my previous
Essay I argued that Patterson suffers from Dworkin's fallacy. Halpin disagrees. This difference between us provides me with the opportunity to elaborate upon what was a very compressed argument
in the original.
Let us begin with Patterson's position in the philosophy of language. Patterson accepts what he describes as Wittgenstein's view
that "the modernist picture of propositional, representationalist
truth [is] unintelligible." 34 The idea of a sentence being true or false
through its relation to the world should be replaced "with an account of understanding that emphasizes practice, warranted assertability, and pragmatism." 35 Rather than seeing knowledge as an ac30

Id. at 185.
Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34
Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth 160--61 (1996); see also Green, supra note 3, at
1933-42.
35
Patterson, supra note 34, at 161.
31
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curate picturing of reality, it "will be unpacked in terms of linguistic competence, facility in the languages of man." 36
This should be familiar, since it is very much akin to Halpin's
idea that "the law and the language of the law are simultaneously
and inextricably together clarified." 37 The truth of statements about
law will depend fundamentally upon facility in linguistic practices.
The attempt to articulate "the ways in which legal language represents, depicts, and captures the world"38 must be abandoned.
But no theory of the nature of the law follows from this insight.
And deriving a theory of the law is just what Patterson tries to do.
The foundation of Patterson's argument is that justifications are
demanded within our legal practices before norms will be enforced.
These justifications, he argues, have certain forms. Patterson then
claims that it follows from the Wittgensteinian insight that "without [these forms] there is no law."39
This is an example of Dworkin's fallacy. If the Wittgensteinian
insight is correct, then the truth of statements about law (for example, the statement "The Securities Exchange Act is valid law in
the United States") is not a question of correspondence to some
external state of affairs-it is instead a matter of facility in talk
about the law. Such facility is manifested by familiarity with certain
forms in which statements about the law are justified. But no theory of the nature of the law follows from this, not even Patterson's
theory that "without [the forms] there is no law." 40
Patterson thinks a theory of the law follows from the Wittgensteinian insight because he conflates the linguistic practice of talking about law with the legal practice of the rule of recognition-that
is, the practice within a jurisdiction of enforcing norms only if they
satisfy certain criteria. The confusion is easy to make because, as
Patterson himself notes, participants in the rule of recognition will
often demand a satisfactory argument before a norm is enforced,
and this argument will have to satisfy certain forms.
But because the two practices are different, so are the two sets of
forms. And it could follow from the forms of the linguistic practice
36

ld. at 169.
Halpin, supra note 1, at 180.
38
Patterson, supra note 34, at 169.
39
Id. at 178.
•o Id.
37
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that the law can exist perfectly well without the forms of the legal
practice. Assume that it follows from the forms of the linguistic
practice that a norm cannot be described as "law" unless it satisfies
certain independent moral requirements. Assume further that according to the forms of a particular rule of recognition, judges do
not require an argument that independent moral requirements are
satisfied when determining whether a norm should be enforced.
Patterson's jurisprudential theory-that the law will depend upon
the forms of the legal practice-will be false, even though the
Wittgensteinian insight that the law and the language of the law
develop together will be true.
Of course it is possible that Patterson never meant his theory to
stand in competition with natural law theory or Hartian conventionalism or Dworkinian interpretivist jurisprudence. He may instead have been objecting to the fact that the philosophers of law
advocating these theories also offer theories of the truth of propositions about law-theories that are contrary to the Wittgensteinian insight. But if that is Patterson's point, why does he take
the failure of the theories of truth to be a reason to criticize the
jurisprudential positions with which they were conjoined? 41 That
the theories of truth fail gives him no reason to believe that the
theories of law are not still correct. Patterson must think the theories of truth and the theories of the nature of law are somehow
connected. The reason, I have argued, is Dworkin's fallacy. Patterson has confused the practice of talking about the law with the rule
of recognition within a jurisdiction.
As we have seen, Halpin also comes to the conclusion that Patterson's Wittgensteinian methodology "furnishes no help in deciding between competing views of how 'law' /law should be understood. " 42 But he arrives at this conclusion in a more circuitous
fashion, because he believes that my argument in Dworkin's Fallacy is confused.
The heart of Halpin's criticism is that in Dworkin's Fallacy I fail
to observe the Wittgensteinian insight concerning "the simultaneous and inextricable development of law and language together at

"Id. at 44-50, 59-70,71-98.
2
Halpin, supra note 1, at 184.

'
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the moment of judgment. " 43 The Wittgensteinian insight shows that
"both the law and the language of the law are developed together
at the point of determining what the law requires. "44 I believe that
Halpin has mistook my insistence that the linguistic practice of
talking about the law needs to be resolutely distinguished from the
rule of recognition within a jurisdiction for a denial of the Wittgensteinian insight. It was not, but my argument was compressed, and
I hope that the current reformulation makes this clear. In my example above, the natural law theorist who refused to call judges'
decisions "law" (because they violated independent moral requirements) came to this judgment within the context of the linguistic practice of talking about the law. The law and the practice
of talking about the law were simultaneously developed when she
made her judgment that the judges' decisions were not law. The
Wittgensteinian insight was therefore satisfied.
What was not simultaneously developed was the law and the rule
of recognition in the judges' jurisdiction. For the judges' decisions
satisfied the forms of argument within the rule of recognition and
yet they were not law. But Patterson was wrong to conclude that
the Wittgensteinian insight gives us a reason to believe that the law
develops as the rule of recognition does, for that would mean misderiving a theory of the law (namely some form of jurisprudential
conventionalism) from the Wittgensteinian insight. And even Halpin agrees that this is a mistake.

43
44

Id. at 183.
I d. at 180.
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